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A QUESTION OF HONOR

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

THE Democratic Platform demands "the immediate ratification of the Peace of Versailles without reservations which would impair its essential integrity," on the ground that "by every accepted standard of international morality the President is justified in asserting that the honor of the country is involved in this business."

We cannot allow the period of public interest in this question to pass without subjecting it to a candid examination in the light of indisputable facts.

If the President is justified in asserting that the honor of the United States has been involved in his negotiations, it is upon the assumption that he has the right, "in his own name and by his own proper authority," to pledge the nation to obligations in excess of his legal powers.

That the prestige of the United States has suffered greatly during the last two years is undeniable. In 1918 our armies were battling to drive the German invaders from the soil of France and Belgium. Their arms were triumphant and released Europe from the peril of subjugation; and yet, when today we contemplate the lack of esteem in which America is held, it almost seems as if the cause for which our soldiers fought had not been won, and that universal confidence in the United States had been changed to general distrust. To what are we to attribute this failure of complete victory and this loss of national prestige?

If we turn to the record of what has happened, it is not difficult to answer this question; but it is necessary to review the course of events with some detail. Such an examination reveals the fact that, at the great turning points of international action, instead of a clear facing of the actual situation and a direct manner of dealing with it, Mr. Wilson introduced some element of unreality, obscuring the truth by phraseology having no essential relation to the state of fact.

As evidence of this I shall cite three instances when the personal decisions and influence of President Wilson deflected the course of events from the direction which they would otherwise have taken, and raised expectations which have not been fulfilled.

In October, 1918, the Central Powers, in a military sense, had been defeated by the joint action of the Allied and Associated Powers. The prompt admission of this defeat, had it been immediately enforced by unconditional surrender, would have prepared the German people for expecting a penalty commensurate with their offense; which would have been regarded as a natural result of the fortunes of war, in which they had always thought of the victor as possessing a right of dictation in proportion to his strength.

This natural consequence of military defeat, with its salutary lesson on the perils incurred by military aggression, was deprived of its disciplinary value by a determination on the part of President Wilson to impose terms of peace which he had outlined long before Germany was conquered, and while "a peace without victory" was still in his mind. The Central Powers, although finally vanquished, were thus given ground for expecting the privilege of open negotiation on equal terms in the settlements of peace. Under a new form of government, which they had set up for the purpose, they expected to be judged and treated as victims of an autocracy which they had in the end helped to overthrow by a demand for the Kaiser's immediate abdication. Neither the armistice nor the final terms of peace bore out these expectations. As a result, penalties which, though severe, are not so burdensome as the Germans themselves, in case of their victory, would have inflicted, and in fact not essentially different from those which might have followed an unconditional surren-

der, are now regarded by the German people as having been imposed upon them in violation of an understanding.

This was not a good beginning for the reorganization of the world. If it accelerated the conclusion of an armistice which defeat had necessitated, the only reason why it can be held to have done so is that hopes were awakened that were not realized; and it introduced conditions of procedure which, as Colonel House has recently alleged, resulted in postponing a preliminary peace which could have been made, he thinks, before Christmas of 1918, thus promptly releasing a starving Europe for its difficult task of recuperation.

Mr. Wilson's illusory terms of peace served, no doubt, to signalize a temporary diplomatic triumph for the Administration at Washington and as a means of placing Mr. Wilson in a position of immense influence at the Peace Conference.

That the acceptance of his programme as a basis for negotiation gave him a prevailing voice in its deliberations cannot be questioned. The questionable point is the propriety of an American President's assuming a preponderant rôle in settlements which were, after all, chiefly European and affecting the permanent interests of Europe. To do this without consultation with any advisory body in the United States,—particularly the President's partner in exercising the treaty-making power, the Senate,—was clearly to presume at the same time upon European deference to American influence and upon American confidence in the personal discretion of the President.

The President went to Paris avowedly to give the Peace Conference the benefit of his "counsel," not in any way to assume new and unprecedented obligations for the United States. No definite plan of international organization had ever been proposed to the country or to the Senate by Mr. Wilson; but, as we now know, he had prepared a plan before he left the United States which he did not disclose. The composition of the delegation he had personally selected and of which he was the self-appointed head, the size and character of the retinue that accompanied him including more than a thousand subordinates, and above all the studied silence concerning what was intended, not only toward the public but his partner the Senate and even members of his Cabinet, awakened at the time much general

comment, and in some quarters created serious disquietude concerning the President's purposes.

Authoritative warning was, in fact, given that any treaty to which the President might subscribe at Paris would receive the closest scrutiny by the Senate, particularly if it committed the United States to any obligations of a character not required for the prompt conclusion of the war. On December 18, 1918, Senator Knox introduced in the Senate a resolution proposing the postponement of "the larger and very disputable question of some comprehensive League of Nations for that separate and very deliberate consideration that its nature demands." On December 21st, Senator Lodge said in the Senate:

The attempt to tack the provisions for an effective League of Nations to the Treaty of Peace now making with Germany would be to launch the nations who have been fighting Germany on a sea of boundless discussion, the very thing Germany most desires. . . . If the attempt were successful . . . and if it were to come before the Senate, it might endanger the Peace Treaty and force amendments. It certainly would lead to very long delays.

At the end of 1918, on account of what the United States forces had accomplished in the war, the prestige of the President in Europe was immense, far greater than it had ever been in America.

If ever, it was a time for "open covenants, openly arrived at." But the President celebrated his departure by having his Postmaster General take over the ocean cables, which had not been thought necessary during the war. Suddenly, while the President in silence put the Atlantic between him and his country, all the means of communication with Europe were placed under Government control!

While the newspapers were filled with the President's speeches to the public in his circular tour as an apostle of peace in Europe, nothing was known of what he was promising in the Supreme Council regarding the future obligations of the United States.

In the fourteenth of the President's "Fourteen Points," he had spoken of "a general association of nations under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." Precisely what this was intended to mean was not clear, but no one supposed that the United States would ever assent to become the guarantor

of the boundaries and independence of all the countries in the world.

That France would be willing to enter into any such general association of which Germany was to be a member, or England to accept international control to maintain the "freedom of the seas, alike in peace and war," as the President hoped, no well informed person in the United States believed; but, even after Clémenceau had made the position of France on this point evident, Mr. Wilson, on December 30, 1918, at Manchester, speaking of America, said:

I want to say very frankly to you that she is not now interested in European politics, but she is interested in the partnership of right between America and Europe. If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination of power which is not a combination of all of us. She is not interested merely in the peace of Europe, but in the peace of the world.

In this statement Mr. Wilson, no doubt, voiced the sentiments of the American people so far as peace is concerned. They desired the peace of the world. They were ready to see the Great War through to a triumphant finish, but they had no wish to become entangled in European politics.

Nothing would have given the American people greater satisfaction than for the President to have said: This war arose from a European quarrel. Its settlement is a European question. You have accepted certain principles as a basis of peace. I trust you will make a peace so just and effectual that you can maintain it without reliance upon the intervention of America. But this was no part of Mr. Wilson's programme. He had conceived the idea that he, personally, was to superintend the entire proceedings at Paris. He continued to urge the "general association," even when it was clear that it could not be made general; with the result that it became precisely that entanglement in European politics which he had professed his intention to avoid.

Professor W. Alison Phillips has pertinently quoted Mirabeau as saying "The metaphysician who travels on the map of the world crosses everything without trouble, and is not embarrassed by mountains, or deserts, or rivers, or abysses; but when one wishes to travel in reality, when

one wishes to arrive at one's destination, it is necessary to remember all the time that one is walking on the earth, and that one is no longer in an ideal world." President Wilson encountered his first reality in Great Britain.

Seeing that Mr. Wilson was aiming to bring the United States into a world combination, British statesmen had promptly busied themselves with plans for utilizing his determination. In a fine spirit of courtesy they took up the expression, "a League of Nations," which he had proposed, and proceeded to adapt it to British uses. Lord Curzon had said in the House of Lords that opinion in England in favor of the League was "rather in advance of the opinion of any of our Allies save the United States"; and added, that "if the British Government went ahead too quickly, or too abruptly, there was danger of a rebuff." The French Government from the beginning had no interest in the League.

Calling upon the inventive powers of General Smuts aided by Lord Robert Cecil, a plan was elaborated which Great Britain could support to her advantage. The scheme, it was frankly confessed, was "modelled on the British Empire, including its crown colonies and protectorates." "The two systems," General Smuts expressly declares, "would closely resemble each other"; and adds, "The League will have a very real rôle to play as the successor to the Empires." The expedient of "mandatories" was to cover with a veil of humanity the effective annexation of vast areas to the spheres of influence of the Great Powers, by which members of the League would rule them as Britain rules her colonies. "So far as the peoples and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey are concerned," says General Smuts, "the League of Nations should be considered as the reversionary in the most general sense, and as clothed with the right of ultimate disposal." At the moment when that sentence was written, secret treaties were already in existence providing for the division and distribution of some of these and other "peoples and territories" among the signatories!

It was soon evident to Mr. Wilson that, by accepting this programme, something in the guise of a "general association" could be formed. On January 19, 1919, the President held a long conference with Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts concerning this project. With the United States and Great Britain united in its support, the

League of Nations was promptly placed in the forefront of the Conference.

For the first time in the history of this country, an American President had assumed, and on certain conditions had been allowed to exercise, a directing influence on distinctly European affairs. Subject to certain important limitations, Mr. Wilson had obtained the ostensible directorship of the Conference.

"I suggest," he is reported as saying, "that as a practical matter a draft of the League of Nations be made by a commission appointed by the Great Powers. This draft could then be submitted to a larger commission on which the Small Powers would be represented." Mr. Lloyd George suggested that, inasmuch as the League of Nations is to be a sort of shield of the Small Powers, the latter should have representatives on the commission; but Mr. Wilson's proposal prevailed, with the consequence that when, on January 25, 1919, the Conference met in plenary session to hear the President's speech, making the League the first item in the treaty of peace, the Small Powers, as a chronicler of the occasion, reports, "were in belligerent mood, because of the rules restricting them to 'particular interests'; and before the session was over they raised a storm."

It was at this meeting that Mr. Wilson entered upon a new rôle for the President of the United States—a rôle which has not only created a distinct political issue in this country, but which, if sustained, amounts to a repudiation of our constitutional arrangements for making international agreements and places the whole foreign policy of the country absolutely in the hands of one man without the correctives of consultation or review.

Claiming to speak officially, and understood as so speaking, Mr. Wilson informed the plenipotentiaries of the Conference that, unless there was to be the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the associated nations of the world, the United States could not take part in "guaranteeing the European settlements." On the other hand, if such superintendence were organized, in order to make it "a vital and not merely a formal thing," he was empowered to pledge to it the support of the United States. With great intensity of feeling, he declared:

You can imagine, gentlemen, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with which representatives of the United States support this

great project for a League of Nations. We regard it as the keystone of the whole programme, which expresses our purposes and ideals in this war and which the associated nations accepted as the basis of the settlement. If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this programme, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens.

And then, as if exhibiting full powers to make the pledges incident to this programme, Mr. Wilson added impressively:

We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest pleasure that we accept that mandate; and because this is the keystone of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single item of the programme which constitutes our instruction.

According to the custom of the Conference, though listened to with keen interest as a statement of American policy, this discourse received neither expressed approval nor disapproval. Without calling for a vote, Clemenceau announced that, if there were no objections, the resolution making the League of Nations a part of the general treaty of peace would be considered as adopted.

After the use of such technical words in the vocabulary of diplomacy as "mandate" and "instruction," of which the delegates "would not dare abate a single item," the one certain conclusion in the minds of the plenipotentiaries was that the President was delivering to the Conference America's authorized ultimatum regarding her participation in its further deliberations.

For the Small Powers, which had looked to the United States to protect their interests by its influence, this was a moment of extreme tension. The League was to be formed and controlled by five Great Powers. Even if it guaranteed their boundaries, these were to be determined by the Supreme Council. Toward the end of the day the gathering storm of protest broke. Representatives of Belgium, Serbia, Greece, Portugal, Czecho-Slovakia, China, Poland, and Roumania all voiced their protest against the discrimination. The Brazilian delegate alleged that it was a "cut-and-dried programme." After much urgency, the Small Powers obtained a larger representation on the League of Nations Commission; Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Czecho-Slovakia being added; but as each of the Great Powers had two votes to the Small Powers' one, the former

retained the majority. The legal equality of independent States was thenceforth to be disregarded.

On February 14th, the first finished draft of "The Constitution of the League of Nations" was read to the full Conference and commented upon by President Wilson. It was not left in doubt that what had been constituted was a new form of sovereign power which the nations were expected to obey, and if necessary would be forced to obey. In unmistakable language Mr. Wilson himself described this new international authority as "the union of wills in a common purpose, a union of wills which cannot be resisted, and which I dare say no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist." And to leave no doubt regarding the compelling power of the League, if any nation attempted to resist it, he added: "Armed force is in the background of this programme, but it *is* in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall."

No such words as those of the President of the United States had ever been uttered in any international conference by any responsible statesman. To those who heard them they could have but one meaning. The United States, with resources but slightly impaired by the war and a great army in the field, was ready to dedicate them to the execution of Mr. Wilson's one distinctive contribution to the substance of the League, the guarantee pledge contained in Article X. This, they were assured, was "the only security for peace"; and it was the "mandate" and the "instruction" of the United States!

It would be unfair to Mr. Wilson to insinuate that he was urging the creation of a super-government for evil purposes. He no doubt sincerely believed that he was doing humanity a great service by creating "a definite guarantee of peace and a definite guarantee against aggression," as he expressed it. But to accomplish this, he was willing to represent that he had official authority which he did not possess, and knew he did not possess. He thought it right, and no violation of his conception of democracy, to assume powers which, great as his office was as President of the United States, his country had never bestowed upon him and, in fact, had unmistakably refused to entrust to him.

For a second time, Mr. Wilson thus introduced into the international situation an element of unreality which seri-

ously confused it and diverted the thought of the time from the prompt conclusion of a victorious war to an expectation that by every test of actuality was illusory.

While it must be conceded that Mr. Wilson at Paris proposed pledges that he had no authority to make for his own country, it cannot be contended that the European Powers can justly complain that in so grave a matter they were deceived. With less plausibility but not with less assurance, Mr. Wilson assumed to speak for all the peoples of Europe, and to declare their purpose, also, to insist upon this League of Nations or overthrow their governments.

"The nations of the world," he said in his speech at Boston, on revisiting America, "have set their heads to do a great thing, and they are not going to slacken in their purpose." He was as sure that he represented the people of Europe in America as he was that he represented the people of America in Europe. "When I speak of the nations," he continued, "I do not speak of the governments of the world. I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the world. They are in the saddle and they are going to see to it that if their present governments do not do their will some other governments shall. And the secret is out and the present governments know it."

The plenipotentiaries at Paris should have seen—it is probable that they did see—that the references to "mandates" and "instruction" from America were as imaginary as the revolutions that were to upset their governments. But they felt that they could not assert this when the President of the United States was the person with whom they had to deal. The protest of thirty-nine Senators against the President's procedure clearly indicated that the Senate was yet to be reckoned with, but there could be no negotiation by or with the Senate. The President must be taken at his word, for otherwise there could be no business with the United States.

Were the Senate or the American people bound by what Mr. Wilson proposed or promised at Paris? "Technically," writes Professor Phillips, in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1920, "President Wilson might still represent the will of the American people; but in the actual circumstances his reiterated claim to do so only deceived the millions outside who knew nothing of the American Constitution and its workings. If the statesmen of the world were

also deceived, the fault was theirs; and it is unfair to blame the American people or their representatives if they refuse to be bound by every letter of agreements entered into, at best, by one part of the treaty-making power without any serious attempt to secure the co-operation and consent of the other."

President Wilson had not only failed to seek co-operation and consent from the Senate, he had openly defied the Senators. Replying to the resolution signed by the thirty-nine, he had said in his address in New York, on March 4th, 1919, on the eve of his departure for Europe:

When that Treaty comes back, gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the Treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the Treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.

When, on March 14th, Mr. Wilson returned to Paris from the United States, he discovered that a resolution proposed by Mr. Balfour had been adopted in his absence,—inspired perhaps by the caution which the Senate's protest had suggested,—providing for an immediate preliminary treaty of peace with Germany containing all the essential settlements, but omitting entirely the League of Nations.

Insisting that the resolution adopted January 25th, which included the Covenant of the League as a part of the Treaty, should be controlling, Mr. Wilson insisted that the preliminary peace plan should be abandoned. As a friend and apologist of the President has said, "It overturned the most important action of the Conference during the President's absence. . . . Within a few days there was a wave of criticism of Wilson which made all former attacks look pale by comparison."

This result was obtained by President Wilson's simple dictum. Nothing had ever been openly discussed or regularly voted upon in the Peace Conference. Everything was decided by the Supreme Council, which began with ten members, and was reduced to three when Mr. Wilson made his maladroit appeal to "the people of Italy" to overrule the attitude of the Italian Government.

There was, however, further and conclusive evidence that Mr. Wilson's proposal of mutual guarantees in which the United States should share was a purely personal and wholly unauthorized proposition. When he returned to

the United States with the final draft of "The Constitution of a League of Nations" under the name of a "Covenant," he had nothing further to say about "mandates" or "instructions." His efforts were then directed toward convincing the Senators and the people of the entirely innocuous character of this document; which, far from guaranteeing anything by really effective means, was now represented as producing universal peace by common consent!

This third element of unreality was fully exploited in the conference of the President with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, at the White House, on August 19, 1919.

In an introductory statement the President undertook to disarm opposition by diminishing as much as possible the extent of the obligations contained in the Covenant. The Council of the League, he said, could only "advise upon" the means by which the obligations were to be given effect. The unanimous vote of the Council, he declared, was required before any advice could be given, and the United States had a vote on this subject. As there is no "sanction" that is, no penalty is imposed upon non-fulfillment—there is only a "moral," not a "legal," obligation to execute the Treaty, which "leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action."

This subtle distinction between different forms of obligation in a treaty evoked expressions of astonishment from several Senators.

As to the privilege of withdrawal in Article I, the President held that the United States would have the right to decide for itself when its obligations had been fulfilled. When Senator Borah inquired if the President was expressing the view entertained by the commission which drew the League, he replied: "That view was not formulated, but I am confident that was the view." "Would there be any objection, then," asked Senator McCumber, "to a reservation declaring that to be the understanding?" Mr. Wilson emphatically declined to have his interpretation thus recorded.

Later on the President's hostility to reservations was brought out more distinctly by the following interchange:

SENATOR MCCUMBER: Mr. President, there are a number of Senators who sincerely believe that under the construction of Article X,

taken in connection with other clauses and other articles in the treaty, the council can suggest what we should do, and of course, while they admit the council can only advise and suggest, that it is nevertheless our moral duty to immediately obey the council, without exercising our own judgment as to whether we shall go to war or otherwise. Now, the public, the American people, a great proportion of them, have that same conviction, which is contrary to your view. Do you not think, therefore, that it would be well to have a reservation inserted in our resolution that shall so construe that section as to make it clear, not only to the American people but to the world, that Congress may use its own judgment as to what it will do, and that its failure to follow the judgment of the council will not be considered a breach of the agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: We differ, Senator, only as to the form of action. I think it would be a very serious practical mistake to put it in the resolution of ratification.

The President having stated that "with regard to the method of fulfilling the obligations of a covenant like that under consideration there is freedom of judgment on the part of the individual members of the League," Senator Harding said:

The President expressed a while ago surprise that I raised a question as to the value of this compact because of the moral obligation feature. Let me premise by the statement that I look upon a moral obligation as that which the conscience of the contracting party impels. The conscience of any nation in Europe, for example, may be warped by its prejudices, racial, geographical, and otherwise. If that be true and any nation may put aside or exercise its judgment as to the moral obligation in accepting any recommendation of the League, really what do we get out of this international compact in the enforcement of any decree?

The President having answered, that we would "get the centering upon it generally of the definite opinion of the world," Senator Harding replied, "That is surrendering the suggestion of a moral obligation for this Republic to the prejudices or necessities of the nations of the Old World, is it not?" and intimated that it would be quite as moral for this Republic itself to determine its moral obligations! Finally, the President having taken refuge in the statement that we are at liberty to reject the judgment of the world as to a moral obligation, "if our moral judgment honestly differs from the moral judgment of the world," Senator Harding exposed the sophistry of Mr. Wilson's whole theory of obligation by asking, since any other nation may take the same position, "What permanent value is there, then, to this compact?"

After a refutation so decisive, it would be useless, in any case, to pursue this subject further, so far as Mr. Wilson personally is concerned; but it is not a person, it is a doctrine, which we now have to combat.

It is this constant appeal to purely subjective standards and the unwillingness to be strictly bound by laws and agreements to which no penalty is attached, that vitiate Mr. Wilson's whole theory of government and official duty. There was no legal penalty attached to his shifting utterances during the war or to his merely personal proposals in the negotiations for peace. He recognized no obligations but those of a "moral" nature, which, he considers, contain nothing explicitly binding, since a personal judgment may determine what the obligation really is. At Paris, not being subject to what he regarded as a legal "sanction," he was under no obligation to consider the constitutional rights of his partners in the process of treaty-making; and could, therefore, freely speak of "mandates" and "instructions" in any way he judged expedient. At Washington, he could interpret Article X as calling for no action, until a country had been invaded, devastated and subjugated, when the question of preserving its territorial integrity and political independence would for the first time arise; and even then each country could take its own advice about it!

Moral obligations do not require treaties to make them binding. They are binding from their very nature. Treaties are intended to make understandings clear, definite, and objectively verifiable. Private judgment does not enter into the interpretation of laws, treaties, and constitutions. They are designed to render accepted obligations imperative. When these are once undertaken honor requires that they must be discharged as they are written.

The chief question regarding the League of Nations is, What is to be done with Article X? In his speech at St. Louis, on September 5, 1919, Mr. Wilson said there was "not a doubtful meaning in the whole document." If, as he insists, this article is the "heart," or the "backbone," of the Treaty, the obligation exists unconditionally for all who accept it, "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League."

The Democratic Platform and the Democratic candidate for the Presidency support the President in saying.

that we are in honor bound to accept this obligation because Mr. Wilson has pledged the country to it. After full conference with Mr. Wilson,—neither being authorized to commit the United States, except “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur,”—Mr. Cox has declared: “What he promised, I shall, if elected, endeavor with all my strength to give.” And the President, satisfied that his legacy of promises has passed into loyal hands, has announced: “He and I were absolutely at one with regard to the great issue of the League of Nations.”

This commitment was unqualified. The Democratic candidate is now bound in honor to accept and perform all the obligations of the Covenant. Are we to have from him a new application of Mr. Wilson’s theory of obligations? Is he ready, in Mr. Wilson’s words, to enter into that “union of wills which cannot be resisted, and which no nation will run the risk of attempting to resist”? Is he prepared to say, “If the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall?” Has he considered what Mr. Wilson’s promises imply?

When Mr. Lloyd George was urged by a deputation of the “League to Abolish War” to make the Covenant of the League of Nations effective by stopping the war against Poland, he replied:

There are two supreme difficulties in the way of bringing the League into full operation now. The first is that all the Powers that have available forces are so absorbed in other duties cast upon them by the war, that they cannot support the decisions of the League. But the second is that the Power which has the means, which has the freedom from entanglement, and which seemed to us at one moment to have all the enthusiasm, has withdrawn. . . . I believe the withdrawal of America from apparent adhesion to the League is a temporary one. But it would be idle now to enter into any discussion with America. Neither of the two parties would commit itself. But these are temporary difficulties, and I am putting them forward rather as an encouragement to the friends of the League.

Speaking of an international army, which the deputation was demanding, the Premier continued:

As a preliminary stage you must have international contributions, before you can ever reach the point of an international army. That may be an ideal, but I am perfectly certain you have got to begin by levying contributions upon States, by saying: “England contributes

5,000, France so much, Norway so much, Sweden so much, and so on." You must do it in that way.

What, since she is now free from entanglement, is America's quota of that army to be, when the Treaty is ratified with "its essential integrity unimpaired," as the Democratic Party and its candidate promise it shall be, if they are in power? Who is to command the army? Whose quarrels is it to settle? How shall the side on which it is to fight be decided? The Council of the League, if permitted, would answer all these questions; and if the United States, after placing itself under that direction, should fail to respond to its decisions, the League would hold that this country had repudiated its obligations.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.